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Abstract
Communication research requires data that are rich enough to contain explicit evidence about processes of
communication. The paper fonnally distinguishes among and discusses three kinds of data: aggregational data
(such as accumulated in much of psychological inquiries, small group experiments and survey research) and
network data (representing observable patterns of interest to relational biology and sociology, for example) are
found to be not rich enough to qualify as communication data proper.
The paper describes an elementary form of communication data that would contain explicit evidence about
the process in question. It exposes some conceptual degenerations in communication research as a
consequence of heavy reliance on inadequate data. Pointing to the fact that the advancement of knowledge is
critically linked to the ability to process a certain kind of data, the paper concludes that communication
research must develop new analytical techniques that are compatible with its most basic concept:
communication.
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Communication research requires data that are rich enough to contain 
explicit evidence about processes of communication. 
The paper fonnally distinguishes among and discusses three kinds of 
data: aggregational data (such as accumulated in much of psychological 
inquiries, small group experiments and survey research) and network data 
(representing observable patterns of interest to relational biology and soci-
ology, for example) are found to be not rich enough to qualify as commWTll£.. 
cation data proper. 
The paper describes an elementary form of communication data that 
would contain explicit evidence about the process in question. It exposes 
some conceptual degenerations in communication research as a consequence 
of heavy reliance on inadequate data. Pointing to the fact that the advance-
ment of knowledge is critically linked to the ability to process a certain kind 
of data, the paper concludes that communication research must develop 
new analytical techniques that are compatible with its most basic concept: 
communication. 
In the field of communication research there exists consider-
able confusion regarding appropriate investigative methods. 
Assertions about the importance of communication processes for 
the functioning of society and individual well being cannot pro-
vide a logical basis for inquiries into the phenomena, nor can they 
define disciplinary boundaries. As part of a larger methodological 
concern, this paper is concerned with the nature of data relevant 
or irrelevant to inquiries into communication processes. It will be 
argued that the form of communication data is fundamentally 
different from much of traditional behavioral science data. This 
presents a unique analytical challenge which needs an appropriate 
response. 
Klaus Krippendorff (Ph.D., University of Illinois) is associate Professor at 
The Annenberg School of Communications, University of Pennsylvania. His 
current interest lies in the methodology of communication research, partic-
ularly of content analysis and of applying cybernetic models to social 
processes. 
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The concept of "data" as used in this paper may be elucidated 
with the help of the diagram in Figure 1. The upper part of the 
diagram is adapted from Coombs' A Theary 01 Data [11:4], Here 
it is suggested that, as a first step, the behavioral scientist must 
decide on the observations to which attention is to be paid. These 
observations are not yet data, however. 
In a second step, observations have to be formalized, i.e., they 
have to be identified, labeled, classified, measured or "translated" 
into terms amenable to subsequent analysis. This step is often 
referred to as the making of fundamental measurements [2.0], as 
data-making [32] or as recording. It should be pointed out that 
the outcome of this step-data-cannot be considered objective in 
the usual sense of the word. In deciding what is relevant to an 
investigative problem and how observations are structured and 
assigned to the formal terms of an analysis, the nature of data 
reflects the scientist's orientation and values. 
The third step in the diagram involves the detection of relation-
ships, order and structure in data and produces explicit evidence 
for inferential classifications. Evidence of this kind follows as a 
logical consequence of the data and of the assumptions that are 
implicit in the analytical procedure. Usually, there are many ways 
of analyzing data and the choice among techniques for trans-
forming data into evidence must be justified in the light of the 
scientist's analytical objectives. 
Scientific inquiries often involve a fourth step at which de-
ductively derived evidence is inductively related to potential 
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observations. Analytical procedures, it should be pointed out, 
operate exclusively on what might be called syntactical structures 
which are manifest in the formal terms of data. Evidence should 
represent such structures in a theoretically meaningful way. In 
contrast, this fourth step might be said to provide a semantic inter-
pretation of evidence in the sense that the terms in which the 
evidence appears are assigned significations and denotations. The 
distinction between analysis and interpretation is important be-
cause only the former can be conclusive in the strict logical sense. 
The latter always involves some uncertainty, nonverifiable as-
sumptions, and guesswork. 
As Coombs has noted, the behavioral scientist enters each of 
these steps in a creative way in the sense that alternatives are 
exhausted by him and his decisions will significantly determine 
the results obtained from the analysis. Thus the universe of avail-
able events can be the same for a large number of disciplines, but 
what is observed and what is extracted from it may be quite dif-
ferent depending on (a) the researcher's analytical objectives, (b) 
his theoretical commitments, and (c) the investigative tools avail-
able to him. For example, a psycholo.gist may stndy society as a 
statistical aggregate of individual properties; a sociologist might 
consider the same as a network of roles, while a biolo.gist would 
perhaps analyze his o.bservations in organismic terms. 
The lower part of the diagram in Figure 1 suggests a bypass of 
the explicit analysis. Intuitive conceptnalizations that may have 
been formed directly from observatio.ns can control the research 
results to. a more or less significant degree. Judgments regarding 
"face validity" exemplify such a case. However, truly critical 
sitnations arise where the research results are claimed to be sup-
ported by evidence that canno.t be derived from data by explicit 
techniques. In such cases uncontro.lled info.rmation must have 
entered the semantic interpretation surreptitiously. This need 
not result from dishonest intentions. Rather, such situations may 
stem from a confusion of explicit evidence with a semantic inter-
pretation thereo.f. And this confusion may stem from a lack of 
understanding of the fo.rmal nature of data, and particularly of the 
kind of evidence that can or cannot be deduced from available 
data. 
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A cQmparison Qf the informational content of a string of sym-
bols, such as the words in a natural language with a frequency 
characterization of the symbQls in this string, provides an obvious 
example. A frequency distribution can be derived from this string 
in a logically determinate way. However, the operation cannot 
be reversed without supplying informatiQn about the Qrder rela-
tionships among thQse symbQls. If someQne claims to. have studied 
the grammar of a language from data that consisted of nothing 
but word cQunts, the internal validity of the analytical process is 
in question o.n the ground that the data base is insufficient and 
hidden infQrmation must have entered the process somewhere. 
It is PQssible to. ascertain, on purely formal grounds, whether 
data can answer given questions, i.e., whether or not the data base 
of an inquiry is rich enQugh to. contain relevant information. De-
cisions of this kind presuppose that the co.ncepts for which evi-
dence is SQught are describable formally or syntactically. If the 
form o.f data is such that it canno.t be mapped (in the mathemati-
cal sense) onto the form of the desired evidence (corresponding 
to the co.ncepts under consideration) then the structure Qf the 
data is inadequate, and can be rejected as irrelevant to. the desired 
evidence. 
The Notion of "Communication Process" 
Several books and a large number of articles devote at least 
part of their discussion to hQW communication can be appre-
hended intuitively. A review of such cQncepts goes beyo.nd the 
SCQpe Qf this paper. Let it merely be stated here that some authors 
consider it a prQcess by means of which Qne mind affects another 
[23]; some writers assign crucial importance to. "messages" as 
mediators between communication agents [16]; and others iden-
tify it as the fabric Qf society Dr as the web that holds any kind Df 
organization tDgether [3, 12,36]. When a group Qf people talk to 
each Dther, it is usually assumed that cDmmunicatiDn is taking 
place. But schQlars disagree considerably as to whether a mutual 
understanding is a necessary prerequisite for deciding whether 
communication had occurred. The audible exchanges amQng 
animals that facilitate cODrdination of their sDcial interaction can 
alSo. be regarded as communication processes. Here the Qbjections 
come from scholars with anthroprocentric attitudes who wish to 
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limit such processes to inter-human activities. Similar contro-
versies exist regarding the criterion of intentionality. The trans-
mission of values and behavior patterns from generation to 
generation is mown to be essential to the maintenance of a 
culture's identity beyond the biological life of its carriers. For-
mally similar is the transmission of genetic information from 
parents to offspring. It is difficult to see why the former process 
is often regarded as one of communication while the latter is 
rarely so interpreted in the social sciences. In both cases, ultimate 
receivers are difficult to determine and the imputation of purpose 
is doubtful. 
Most of these debates are irrelevant to a theory of data. As 
stated above, in order to recognize communication processes in 
data, it is imperative that the intuitive concept of communication 
be explicated and stated in an appropriate technical language. 
Intuitively meaningful references to man, animals or machines or 
to the channels among them may guide the behavioral scientist's 
choice of observations. But such references cannot influence the 
evidence that data can provide unless they are themselves for-
malized and take their pJace in the form of data. 
Elsewhere I have argued for a syntactical definition of com-
munication. It seems that the only reasonable delineation of the 
empirical domain of the social communication sciences stems 
from a theoretical commitment, i.e., a commitment regarding the 
form of objectifications (theories, models, etc.) of real world 
events. Communication sciences do not characteristically view 
their objects as things or as combinations of properties, but as 
patterns of dynamic interdependencies. The theoretical commit-
ment underlying the various approaches to communication re-
search seems reflected in the understanding of "communication' 
as a process of tramsmission of structure among the pa:rts of a 
system which are identifiable in time and space [22]. 
Such a formulation can readily be put into a mathematical form 
which can in tum be searched for in adequate data. It can also be 
given a variety of semantic interpretations thus showing it to be 
sufficiently general. The "systems" may be biological, cognitive 
or social in nature. The "structures" transmitted may involve 
genetic, linguistic or cultural patterns of meaning. The notion of 
"process" subsumes that of behavior or changes over time. "Trans-
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Figure 2 
Evidence provided by minimum and rich communication data 
mission" implies information exchange and control over geo-
graphic distances. The emphasis on transmission "among the 
parts" directs attention to the complex fabric that integrates indi-
vidual behaviors into organized wholes rather than to the nature 
of a system's individualized components. 
Communication Data 
The task of communication research is presumably one of pro-
viding conclusive evidence about the parameters according to 
which the process may be explained, predicted and/or controlled. 
However, there are virtually no limitations as to the number and 
kind of parameters that might be considered relevant for this pur-
pose. Consequently, there is no upper limit as to the informational 
richness that communication data may exhibit. But there is a 
lower limit below which data remain meaningless as far as com-
munication constructs are concerned. This seems to provide a 
more reasonable definitional criterion of communication data: 
communication data must provide explicit evidence at least about 
the existence or non-existence of communication processes. Fig-
ure 2 depicts the evidence that minimum communication data 
and, what might be called, "rich" communication data respec-
tively provide. The analysis of minimum communication data 
merely involves a decision with two outcomes. The analysis of 
rich communication data may involve a large number of decisions 
regarding which of the possible parameters provides the best ac-
count of the process manifested in data. Evidently, making choices 
among the parameters of communication presupposes decisions 
regarding the presence of the process. Thus rich communication 
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data fully include the evidence that minimum communication 
data contain. 
With this very rough framework in mind it is now possible to 
consider three kinds of data and ask in each case whether they can 
provide evidence for communication processes as defined. 
AGGREGATIONAL DATA 
The F()/"m of Aggregational Data 
In the sciences dealing with man, by far the most elaborate 
analytical methods are used in psychology. Here the basic theo-
retical commitment lies in the assumption that human behavior 
can be understood as a response to both environmental stimuli 
and characteristics of the individual, his personality for example. 
In addition, psychological schemes of explanation exhibit a 
minimum concern for the intervening physiological mechanisms 
[2]. Data that are gathered with these commitments in mind 
usually exhibit the following form: 
( 1) There is either one set A or two distinct sets A and B of 
observations. 
( 2) Each member of the set is described in terms of. ( classified 
or scaled along) one or more dimensions x, i.e., A C IIxr 
and/or Be IIxs. 
(3) One kind of binary relation is specified between a collec-
tion of pairs of observations, i.e., d( at,aj) or d( at,b j ) where 
d is either an order relation or a distance, aeA, beB. 
This is essentially Coombs' [11] analysis, which he developed in 
much greater detail than is required here. 
Among the many semantic interpretations that can be given to 
aggregational data are the following examples: a set of individ-
uals are asked to judge the appearance of a set of mass circulation 
magazines along semantic differential scales. Such scales consti-
tute what Osgood et al. [27] call a semantic space, and distances 
between pairs of points are presumed to be indicative of effective 
similarities. 
In experimental settings in which subjects are asked to indicate 
their preference between television shows, consumer products or 
works of art, individual responses specify an order relation be-
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tween pairs of stimuli. Similarly, answers to such questions as 
the extent to which a subject desires to continue watching a 
violent movie or the extent of disapproval of a political candidate 
specify proximity relations between pairs of observations, con-
cepts or individuals. Distances of this sort define a psychological 
space in which data may be represented as points. 
It is important to note that observations are recorded and 
treated as collections (involving no inherent order) that define 
statistical distributions in point spaces. The analysis of such data 
invariably involves an aggregation, a statistical summation of 
individual cases. The recorded responses of a number of individ-
uals to a set of political speeches may be used to classify the indi-
viduals involved or to group the speeches to which each was 
exposed. They may yield a simpler description of stimulus mate-
rial involving fewer factors, or they may produce variables that 
best predict how individuals react to speeches of a certain kind. 
In either case the result is an aggregation of many responses by 
many individuals to many speeches. 
The Scope of Aggregational Data 
A few quite different semantic interpretations of aggregational 
data exhibit an extremely wide scope: the correlations between a 
variety of daily habits and the occurrence of cancer are based on 
aggregational data. The changes of stock market prices in re-
sponse to political crises, the co-occurrence of riots with warm 
weather and other environmental factors, the effects of fertilizers 
on the growth of grain under a variety of climatic conditions, 
etc.-all are based on the aggregation of a large number of obser-
vaf;ions that are scaled or categorized along many dimensions and 
between which not more than binary relations are specified. Evi-
dently, when aggregational data are stripped of their particular 
semantic interpretation, there is nothing peculiarly human or 
peculiarly psychological about it. It is in this sense that data are 
regarded here in syntactical terms and as objects of mathematics. 
Similarly the mode of analysis is independent of what the data 
may represent. 
While aggregational data exhibit a wide scope they also have 
severe limitations: not all phenomena can be captured when data 
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are viewed as collections of the characteristics of individuals, 
stimuli, responses, etc. As Barton put it with reference to survey 
research in sociology: 
" ... using random sampling of individuals, the survey is a sociological 
meat grinder, tearing the individual from his social context and 
guaranteeing that nobody in the study interacts with anyone else in it 
It is a little like a biologist putting his experimental animals through a 
hamburger machine and looking at every hundredth cell through a 
microscope; anatomy and physiology get lost; structure and function 
disappear, and one is left with cell biology [7]. 
The same metaphor applies when designing psychological ex-
periments or examining statistical records of large-scale phenom-
ena. Whether individuals, diseases, telephone calls or riots are 
aggregated, they must be regarded as independent of each other. 
Where the generation of data can to some extent be controlled, 
behavioral scientists take care to make sure that their units of 
enumeration are independent in fact. 
In his paper, Barton reviews attempts to bring social structure 
"back in" survey data. Among the more prominent devices is to 
record individuals' perception of interpersonal environments, to 
request that sociometric choices be revealed, or to sample insti-
tutional settings and inter-institutional relationships. The intui-
tive link between social structure and the evidence that aggreg,a-
tional data may provide lies in the postulated effect of such a 
structure on its component parts: if such a structure has some 
degree of reality then it would presumably be reflected in the 
way individuals perceive each other or in the way inter-institu-
tional relationships are distributed. For example, if there is 
something to a social group as opposed to a collection of strangers, 
sociometric choices among members should be expected to ex-
hibit a non-random distribution. This is presumably the result of 
how members work together, talk with each other, etc. It is on 
the basis of such assumptions that aggregational data may become 
indicative of possible dependencies among the aggregated units. 
But these dependencies are not represented in such data. 
Use and Limitations in Communication Research 
Suppose a group of students is observed debating how to stage 
a sit-in or whether to support a political candidate. No doubt 
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we experience by any definition that members of this group 
communicate with each other and we may observe the results of 
such communication in the collective activities that follow. The 
most common way of mapping such a situation into aggregational 
data is to record what each individual receives and how he 
responds to it. The data that would be generated in this case 
come close to those of Bales [6]. 
It is not difficult to see that an aggregation of such data over the 
individuals concerned is effectively equivalent to the generation 
of data from experiments in which isolated individuals respond to 
the stimuli presented. From such data alone it is impossible to 
ascertain whether individuals were in fact communicating with 
each other during the observation period or whether they behaved 
in isolation. The behavior of isolated individuals or, more spe-
cifically, data that record the behavior of individuals as isolated 
regardless of the social experimental setting (which mayor may 
not include communication activities), cannot provide explicit 
evidence for the existence of communication processes. 
The situation would not change very much if attention were to 
shift from the individuals that are connected through a communi-
cation net to their verbal exchanges. The collection of "who says 
what to whom" or Newcomb's [26] co-orientation is only another 
interpretation of the collection of "what causes X's response" or, 
loosely, of stimulus-response connections. Both conform to the 
formal characteristics of aggregational data. Both define point 
distribution in multidimensional space in which distances may 
become psychologically meaningful. Both permit a variety of 
inferential classifications but neither contains evidence of the 
dynamics of the process or of the network characteristics of these 
exchanges. Aggregational data are simply inadequate to contain 
evidence of communication processes. They do not satisfy the 
minimum criteria for communication data. 
What designates studies using such data as "communication 
research" is not the kind of evidence it provides; rather, it is how 
the results of such an analysis are interpreted semantically. 
Often, it is the observer's assumed authority as a communication 
researcher which leads him to decide whether the group members 
are in fact communicating with each other and whether the stim-
ulus is a communication. The uncertain observer may assure 
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himself by asking the subjects if they felt that they did communi-
cate. But such answers beg the question by not exhibiting what 
goes on among the individuals rather than within each. 
Yet, "communication research" flourishes despite its heavy 
reliance on aggregational data and on analytical techniques that 
are so conveniently geared to this kind of data. This is evident in 
the literature on persuasion initiated by Hovland [19] and recently 
reviewed by Sears and Abeles [29]; in the work done on infor~ 
mation diffusion [28]; in research into small groups phenomena 
[15] including communication nets [30]; and in inquiries into 
psycholinguistic processes [13], as well as in ahnost all the studies 
in mass communication reviewed by Tannenbaum and Greenberg 
[33]. 
The heavy use of aggregational data puts communication re~ 
search on extremely uncertain grounds. The fact that evidence of 
communication processes cannot be deduced from such data has 
caused another unfortunate development: severe conceptual im-
poverishment. If the intuitive and powerful notion of communica-
tion process is stripped of its relational qualities and processual 
characteristics (as it is when aggregational data are generated), 
then communication reduces to nothing but another variable. 
Just as anxiety is thought to vary from low to high, attitudes are 
scaled along dimensions such as strong-weak and violence is 
measured in degrees, so is communication reduced to the more or 
less of one or the other quality. This is indeed the common 
denominator of most of the studies that are otherwise methodo-
logically impeccable. The explanatory power of the notion of 
"communication process" is then virtually eliminated. Blumer [8] 
too observes inadequacies of sociological evidence relying on 
aggregational data. He argues from a slightly different perspec-
tive that "modes of interpretation" cannot be described by "varia-
bles" and that researchers who force their observatioos into such 
forms might not be able to tab the critical process intervening 
between overtly obvious phenomena. In other words, communica-
tion can then not be regarded as a mediational phenomenon. 
NETWORK DATA 
The Form of Network Data 
In contrast to the psychological focus on the behavior of indi-
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viduals taken as a whole, there is another research tradition 
which is concerned with organizations involving individuals. 
Theoretical commitments in sociology, political science and an-
thropology suggest expJaining the social behavior of groups and 
their members in terms of the way individuals are related to each 
other, i.e., in terms of social structure. 
Such concepts as "level of integration of political units," 
"alienation of a class of individuals," or "pattern-maintenance 
functions of an institution" are clearly understood as correlates of 
particular relations among individuals although they are rarely 
defined on those relations. This is presumably because analytical 
techniques are not as highly developed in these disciplines. The 
situation would be different if such properties are deduced from 
the recorded patterns of interaction, from organizational charts, 
from flow-diagrams, or from a graph of possible telephone con-
nections from networks of interpersonal communication. To ex-
plain social behavior in terms of the relations among individuals 
or among societal units presupposes that the relations of interest 
are explicitly identifiable in relevant data, and not merely inferred 
from their presumed behavioral consequences. 
The kind of data that would contain evidence about the way 
individuals, groups and organizations are related satisfies the fol-
lowing requirements: 
(1) There are many distinct sets A,B .... ,Z of observations. 
(2) Each observation may be described in terms of (classified 
or scaled along) one or more dimensions, i.e., A C IIxe, 
B C IIxf, . . . , Z C IIxm • 
(3) One or more kinds of many-valued relations R are specified 
among the observations, e.g., Rl (a,b,c), R2 (a,b,c, ... z). 
( 4) Some relations imply other relations, e.g., Rl (a,b,c,d) ~ 
Ra(a,c,d). 
For lack of a better term, I call these data network data. 
A kinship system provides a good example of what network 
data may contain. Individuals may be described in terms of sex, 
age, maturity, etc. But of crucial importance are such relational 
attributes as lineal, colineal and ablineal descendent, and genera-
tional differences. It is the relationships which usually determine 
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the kind of interpersonal interaction that may emerge and how 
kinsmen perceive themselves as related. The way A is related to 
B usually implies how B is related to A and delineates, to some 
extent, how A and B behave toward each other. Adequate data on 
kinship would have to exhibit which relations are equivalent and 
which relations between A and B and between A and C imply 
which relations between B and C. 
The wayan organization analyst may chart lines of authority in 
a bureaucratic institution is another example of the use of network 
data. Observations regarding the scope of each office's super-
visory functions and the formal and informal channels of influence 
connecting the individuals involved yield relational nets, typically 
hierarchies, from which, among other things, the possible paths 
of a command may be deduced. That A's direct authority over B 
and B's direct authority over C often implies A's indirect authority 
over C again exemplifies the implications inherent in network 
data. Recently Friedell [14] described organizations as semilat-
ices using data from Street Corner Society as examples. He thus 
made use of a way to represent many valued dependencies as a 
hierarchy of relations. 
In the study of communication processes, the mapping of net-
works is basic. Lasswell's question "Who says what to whom 
with what effect?" requires at least a relational answer. The 
practice of answering it as if it consisted of several independent 
questions seems linguistically legitimate but eliminates the crucial 
relational aspect of communication. When it is said that A com-
municates with B who in turn communicates with C, a transmis-
sion chain is identified. When, in addition, C communicates with 
A, a transmission loop is described. The use of digraphs in dia-
gramming complex communication nets is common [18] even 
though the mathematical implications of this approach are not 
always utilized. 
I should like to add that graphical representations of networks, 
e.g., using digraphs, are often misleading. Simply because it is 
difficult to connect more than two modes with one arrow, such 
descriptions readily suggest that relations between sources and 
receivers, for example, are exclusively binary in character. If a 
number of communicators coordinate their activity in a certain 
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way, the resulting relation among them may not be describable 
in binary terms. Tertiary relations (involving three individuals), 
quaternary relations, ... , n-ary relations are difficult to visualize 
and present even more serious problems of analysis. 
The important analytical task of manipulating network data is 
therefore a decomposition of many-valued relations into relations 
of a lower order [5]. Systems analysts talk about hierarchical 
decomposition [31]. Quantitative notions of the relative inde-
pendence and density of a network, but more important, such 
mathematical properties of relations as symmetry, transivity and 
reflexivity provide powerful analytical devices for the decomposi-
tion of network data. 
Suppose we observe a large group of individuals at a social 
gathering. Unless highly institutionalized forms of behavior exist 
-such as at a public speech-it is very unlikely that interaction 
patterns involving, say, lOOO individuals need to be recorded. 
Perhaps the order of the manifest relations does not exceed twenty 
at anyone point in time and relations that are persistent during 
such a gathering may not involve more than five individuals. 
Without any doubt such a finding would constitute a tremendous 
saving of subsequent analytical and conceptual efforts. Similarly 
does the web of a city's telephone connections look umnanageably 
complex to an alien. However, if the calls between any two sta-
tions are found not to be conditional on a third, then the appar-
ently complex network can at once be decomposed into a set of 
binary connections. It is precisely when communication is nearly 
absent, such as among the drivers of cars, among people being 
interviewed in isolation from each other, or among the members 
of large mass media audiences, that mere aggregational properties 
appear significant. 
Relational biology, on the other hand, has shown that organic 
functions often constitute an irreducible complex of mutual con-
ditionality. If the connection between a parr of organs is inter-
rupted, the whole complex may collapse. Mutual conditionality 
is also the essence of organization [3]. To treat social organiza-
tions as if they were fully decomposable-for example by 
interviewing each individual member-may miss their unique 
properties. Whether and the extent to which a many-valued 
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relation can be decomposed, i.e., whether such a relation can be 
considered as an aggregate of lower order relations, should not be 
a matter of a priori decisions. Data themselves must provide the 
answers. 
Relation to Aggregational Data 
The possibility of decomposition links aggregational data with 
network data. Aggregational data can always be interpreted as 
a collection of distance~or ordering-relations between pairs of 
points, i.e., as a collection of either one or another kind of binary 
relation. Thus, if an elaborate network can be fully decomposed 
into a set of binary relations with a metric interpretation and if 
the values (individuals, stimuli, etc.) of these relations are drawn 
from not more than two. distinct sets, then, in this special case, 
network data and aggregational data are equivalent. Formally, 
aggregational data are a special case of network data, the latter 
being informationally richer and, as far as their explanatory po-
tential is concerned, more powerful. This can already be seen as 
implied by their formal definition. 
Often the underlying network of communication caunot enter 
the data because of . ( a) experimental constraints, (b) limited 
observational schemes, and (c) methodological biases. In gather-
ing sociometric choices, for example, it is the experimental setting 
which precludes network data from emerging. While filling out 
the forms, communication among individuals is not permitted. 
Assurances to subjects that individual choices will not be dis-
closed to members of the group is another way of suppressing the 
emergence of higher order "choices." The fact that sociometric 
choices among known friends tend to correlate, shows that the 
method has considerable face validity. But it should be pointed 
out that one essential property of social structure is that choices of 
friends, or perceptions of social proximities and the like tend to be 
mutually conditioned. Such a conditionality is reflected in the 
possibility that A's choice of B-if communicated to C-will affect 
C's choice of D. This is already a quaternary relation which 
simply cannot emerge because the experimental setting systemati-
cally suppresses communication. 
Another factor which prevents higher-order relations from ap-
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pearing in data are pDwerless observation schemes. Bales [6] 
again demonstrates this point. The constraints which members of 
a freely interacting prDblemsolving group mutually impDse upon 
each Dther are simply ignored except where they affect binary 
relations Df the type "A asserts C to B." Subsequent analysis Dften 
reduces these binary relatiDns, of which Bales differentiates 16 
different kinds, to properties associated with individuals. Thus 
even the minimal relational content of aggregational data is elim-
inated. 
Shaw's [30] review Df inquiries into communicatiDn networks 
within small groups reveals how methodDlogical biases can ob-
scure evidence about the effects Df higher-order communication 
patterns. In this research tradition communication links among 
individuals are manipulated so that the effects Df a variety of 
channel configurations on group behavior can be studied. How-
ever, since traditional methods do not readily provide descriptive 
devices for such networks (other than mere verbal designatiDns 
in such terms as "chain," "wheel," and "Y") researchers seek to' 
quantify and regard as a variable the properties of the nodes Df 
such networks. Experimental evidence tends then to' be cast in 
terms Df correlatiDns among the individual's centrality, peripher-
ality, saturatiDn, and independence and many-valued channel 
cDnfigurations which the experiments utilize are discarded to 
cDnform to' established methDds Df analysis. (It is interesting to' 
Dbserve that the experimental design Df communication networks 
has by and large restricted itself to' communication among five 
but nDt mDre than six individuals. This is mDst prDbably due to' 
the fact that the number of pDssible communicatiDn patterns is an 
exponential function Df the number of individuals invDlved. As 
the number Df individuals increases, computational requirements 
quickly spiral beyond the SCDpe Df current analytical techniques.) 
AlthDugh analytical techniques fDr netwDrk data are not as well 
known as those for aggregational data, they are not altogether 
absent. In general, such techniques tend to' be qualitative, i.e., 
algebraic and logical, rather than statistical. Qualitative tech-
niques can be as conclusive as statistical Dnes. Recent advances 
in the algebra Df relations and in the computability of hierarchical 
representatiDns, e.g., in terms Df list structures, permit symbDlic 
manipulatiDn Df complex netwDrks without toO' much loss Df detail. 
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The Use and Limitations of Network Data in 
Communicatio1l8 Research 
As I argued above, the notion of communication always implies 
a relational component: a message is sent from A via B to C. 
Interaction among individuals is understandable largely in terms 
of the stable relationships that have developed among them [35]. 
The question must therefore be raised as to whether or not com-
munication processes can be detected in network data. Unfortu-
nately, the answer is negative. 
If communication patterns are recorded as networks, there is 
nothing peculiar in the properties of communication relations that 
could not be found in entirely different domains. For example, 
the binary relations "A talks to B," "A likes B," "A signifies B," and 
"A is smaller than B" are all formally identical as far as 
their anti-symmetry is concerned. What makes the first of these 
relations one of communication is not its formal property, but its 
semantic interpretation. There is very little in network data that 
would permit the analyst to differentiate a communication pat-
tern from a family tree, a work schedule or a graph of functional 
requirements as used in architectural design [1]. While being 
informationally richer than aggregational data, network data are 
still not powerful enough to represent the formal properties of 
communication processes. 
This inadequacy of network data is quite obvious. It stems 
from their static nature. Relations either hold or do not hold and, 
when a number of "time slices" are summed, relations may be 
said to occur with a certain frequency. Clearly, a representation 
of this kind does not provide implications along the time dimen-
sion as the notion of a process requires. 
Relations such as "A dominates B," "A supports B provided that 
C supports A" or "A,B,C, and D trade with each other cyclically" 
often are the reflections of underlying communication processes. 
As in the case of aggregational data, network data may represent 
correlates of communication processes (the outcome of interper-
sonal communication or the contractural result of bargaining) but 
not the process in which such relations may have evolved. Al-
though it cannot be ignored that such data may aid intuition 
about communication or serve as a particular abstraction, there is 
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no way to explicate and analyze processes of communication on 
the basis of network data alone. 
ELEMENTARY· COMMUNICATION DATA 
Formal Requirements on Content 
Mter having shown that aggregational data and network data 
obliterate the very properties which constitute the target of in-
quiries into communication processes, I will now tum to a more 
positive argument and point out at least the minimal formal 
requirements which communication data must satisfy. This re-
striction to "minimal formal requirements" is dictated by the well 
known fact that analytical and conceptual efforts quickly spiral 
into unmanageable proportions once all conceivable intricacies of 
communication processes are considered. 
An abstract statement of these formal requirements is not too 
difficult: 
(1) All requirements of network data must be satisfied. 
(2) Three-or-higher-valued transformations, T, involving time, 
are specifiable oyer at least two distinct sets of configura-
tions, Rn (describable in terms of network data), e.g., 
T(Rl X RZ)t-l = (Rz)t. 
First, there must be identifiable in time and space two or more 
component parts of a system. The individual members of a small 
group, the organs of a complex organism, but also the components 
of a modem electronic computer might be interpreted in these 
terms. Each component may be described geographically (as oc-
cupying a certain space) and chronologically (along a time dimen-
sion) by the set of states it can take or by the possible configurations 
it can receive, memorize or emit. A description of each of these 
configurations, pattern, structures, etc., remains essentially within 
the power of network data as discussed above. 
Second, the component parts and consequently the system as 
a whole should possess dynamic properties jointly and of their 
own. Relevant data must have the potential to exhibit an orderly 
variation of states, a regularity or some predictability along the 
time dimension. Therefore, one important analytical task is to 
identify some constraint over the succession of states and describe 
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it as a transformation or as a set of possible transitions of one 
configuration at one point in time into another configuration at 
some later point in time. Just as we say that an individual goes 
through a sequence of behavioral routines that are in part cul-
turallyprescribed or psychologically motivated, so may the be-
havior of a social organization be described as a changing pattern 
of more or less coordinated activities involving many individuals. 
The delivery of a speech clearly involves a sequence of bodily 
gestures and linguistic pattern and the visible behavior of a 
newspaper are the configurations of print together with their 
semantic interpretations that are turned out in regular intervals. 
However, a behavior that could be depicted by transformations 
of the form: 
Rt - 1 -7 Rt 
is of little interest to communication researchers. It would be 
equivalent to describing the behavior of closed and whole systems 
without reference to their components. If such a transformation 
could be isolated successfully, communication is irrelevant as a 
construct. Communication processes are conceptually linked to a 
conditionality of behavior across the components of a system and 
communication data must exillbit at least three-valued trans-
formations. More specifically, if R is the repertoire of possible 
inputs or the set of receivable message configurations, M is the set 
of internal states or memory configurations, and E is the set of 
outputs or emittable message configurations, then the kind of 
three-valued transformations that may be deduced from data 
could have the form: 
and 
(R X M)t-l -7 E t 
The former characterizes a change in the internal state of an 
individual regardless of what he emits. This may correspond to 
attitude change or, more generally, learning. The latter describes 
his emission as a consequence of both his previous receptions and 
his state of memory or cognition. Individuals often talk without 
external stimulation and change their minds without overt changes 
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in behavior. There may not be any statistical correlation between 
input and output, or between stimulus and response. Transforma-
tions of the above form can account for such facts. However, they 
still have little to do with communication processes. They merely 
characterize behavior as an open system as it has been studied 
extensively under the name of automata theory [17, 24, 25, 34]. 
But automata theory is heavily geared toward synthesis while its 
analytical component if not as highly developed. Progress can be 
noted, however, in its application to linguistic theory [9, 10]. 
According to our definition of communication data we require, 
thirdly, that such data provide the basis for deciding whether or 
not structure is transmitted among the component parts of a sys-
tem. Communication always involves a coding of patterns of one 
form in one medium into another form of another medium. The 
most common technical example is the translation of visual images 
into electrical impulses, radiowaves, movements of an electrode, 
and ultimately back into visual forms. This is quite analogous to 
the process of transforming mental configurations into verbal ex-
pressions and back into cognitive structures. Such a transmission 
does not require exact replication: the translation of the script for 
a play into a performance may be regarded as a transmission 
process just as the transfer of technology from one domain of 
application into another constitutes such a process regardless of the 
media involved. Communication has to do with the transfer of be-
havior patterns, decoding and encoding of linguistic structures, 
and reproduction of cognitive configurations, but communication 
also involves time and may involve delays, autocorrelation, "chunk-
ing," and conditioning, i.e., communication channels may exhibit 
memory as one of several other characteristics. 
We can thus regard the input to the communication process as 
the emission, and its output as the reception, of each component 
part of a system. If the memory or channel characteristics of the 
process are denoted by C, the transformations for which evidence 
is to be sought then has the following form: 
(El X E2 X '" En X C)t-l ~ Ct 
and 
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R, 
~ Behavior ~ 
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Flow diagram of a system with n components and the communication 
among them 
where E denotes emissions, R denotes receptions and subscripts 
designate the communicators involved. 
A formal comparison of the transformations accounting for the 
behavior of each of a system's parts with the transformations 
representing possible communication processes reveals them to be 
formally equivalent. Both pairs describe processes of information 
transmission. The former describes such process within, the latter 
across, the communicators. Both can be treated by the same 
analytical techniques. 
This surprising isomorphism, visualized in Figure 3, suggests 
that from a mathematical point of view the distinction between 
262 The Journal of Communicatwn, Vol. 20, September 1970 





















1.:-"':--1 Trans- 1----'--'--'---'-' 
1st Camp mission 
Figure 4 
Identification of behavior and transmission in communication data 
individual behavior and the communication process is quite arbi-
trary. Just as individuals are said to be linked by a communication 
net, so can it be said that the communication net is closed by 
the individuals concerned. The distinction is merely conceptual 
and often leads to chicken-egg-type problems. Together both con-
stitute one system the understanding of which seems to me to be 
the aim of communication research. 
The Form and Analysis of Communication Data 
In order to provide evidence about the existence and nature of 
the transfonnations which I have delineated, data must be re-
corded so that (a) the sequence of states of the system as a whole 
can be examined in their chronological order. In addition, (b) a 
diachronical differentiation must be made among at least two sets 
of configurations corresponding to the states of at least two com-
ponents. While communication data may have several different 
forms, the easiest way to understand such data is as a protocol [4], 
or as the tape of a Turing Machine with many channels, each of 
which contains information about the states of the communication 
agents involved, their emissions and their receptions. 
The task of analyzing minimum communication data then be-
comes one of ascertaining whether or not some constraint on the 
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possible succession of states can be demonstrated to exist across 
the components of the system over time. This is the obverse to 
saying that the task is one of testing for whether or not interaction 
among the individuals exhibits some regularity over time or is 
rule-like. If such a constraint can be shown to be present in data, 
then some transformation, some explanatory device, might be 
formulated to account for it. 
Klir [21] visualizes the domains and ranges of the possible 
transformations by means of a mask with windows defined over 
the protocol entries as in Figure 4. Such a device covers those 
states or configurations which the analyst does not wish to con-
sider and makes relevant configurations available in its openings 
for inspection. As the protocol is moved to the left, those config-
urations over which orderly variations are expected or transforma-
tions are sought become successively available. 
Klir's work centers around the problem of describing the be-
havior of the system as a whole. The domain and range of the 
transformation to be sought is then defined over any possible 
set of windows of the mask. However, when evidence about the 
existence or nonexistence of communication is to be extracted 
from the protocol, the configurations of interest are. those that 
might be transmitted across and processed within each compo-
nent. 
Figure 4 depicts two masks. The one labeled "behavior" ex-
poses those configurations that are relevant to describe the 
behavior of one component of the system (e.g., a hypothesized 
communicator). It makes available for analysis the messages he 
receives, his particular memory configurations and the subsequent 
configurations of emission. The arrows correspond to those of the 
three-valued transformations discussed above. Unless some con-
straint on the co-occurrence of states in E1, Rl and Ml can be 
demonstrated to persist over time, there is little sense in trying to 
describe the process by a transformation or as information proc-
essing. 
The mask labeled "transmission" exposes those configurations 
that are relevant to describe processes of transmission among the 
. components suspected to communicate. This includes the mes-
sages that each individual emits at time t-1 (the input into the 
communication net), the memory states of the channels, and the 
. 
I 
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configurations of each individual's receptions (the output of the 
communication net). The arrows which connect the windows' 
openings of this mask likewise correspond to the arrows used 
above to define the many-valued transformations. If a constraint 
on the possible co-occurrence of states on the emission side and on 
the reception side can be shown to persist over time, then evidence 
for the existence of communication is provided, interaction is pres-
ent, and information is transmitted. To account symbolically for 
such constraints across communication agents, to describe their 
dynamic conditionality as interactions, or to specify the transmis-
sion process as a transformation requires additional analytical 
efforts with which I cannot deal within the limits of this paper. 
A realistic example requires at least three-dimensional transition 
tables that are too large to make the constraint we are seeking 
easily recognizable and might still be an oversimplification. But 
oversimplification is necessary here to make the point. Let me 
therefore merely use a few more words in place of the symbols. 
Suppose we observe a two-person telephone conversation and 
we have a protocol consisting of state descriptions of 
El = his emissions 
E2 = her emissions 
Rl = his interpretation of her emissions 
R2 = her interpretation of his emissions 
Ml = his internal states 
M2 = her internal sta.tes 
c= the "memory" characteristics of the channel. 
The emissions may consist of linguistic expressions, gestures, and 
sound not all of which are transmitted through the channel. These 
emissions are interpreted by the receiving individual (and moni-
tored by the source). The internal states of the individuals may 
be described in terms of emotions, a.ttitudes, conceptions of self 
and the environment or as cognitive states of mind. 
If communication between the two individuals is present, then 
one should expect that his emissions are in some systematic way 
related to her interpretation of his emissions and vice versa. Here 
one does not need to require a perfect reproduction of the message 
configuration sent; any distortion or misunderstanding will do as 
long as it is systematic. Often though, the receiver's interp'l'eta-
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tions are inaccessible, in which case we have to identify communi-
cation in the conditionality that his verbal behavior imposes on 
her verbal behavior at some later step in time and vice versa. 
Communication must also be regarded as evident when conven-
tions and inter-individual relations are established in the course of 
the interaction according to which subsequent interpretations and 
emissions are regulated. 
Communication cannot be considered evident, for example, 
either when he gives everything that she says the single interpre-
tation: "nagging" and responds to his singular interpretation 
regardless of the variation her verbal behavior exhibits, or when 
his interpretations of her speech are entirely erratic, random and 
in no way constrained by what she says. In such a situation we 
would expect that all triples in 
(E2 X Ch-l X Ct 
and in 
(E2 X C)t-l X (R1)t 
and/or all quadruples in 
(E2 X C)t-2 X (M1)t-l X (E1)t 
would be observed freely. Any constraint on the occurrence of 
such m-tuples across individuals must be regarded as evidence 
for the existence of a process of communication from her to him. 
Communication in the other direction can be considered by 
analogy. 
This example should be interp'reted with the intended gener-
ality in mind. A protocol may describe many more such variables 
for suspected communicators which in turn may represent bio-
logical organs, people, social institutions, or machines. The 
reliance on an abstract mathematical formulation prevents such 
generalities from becoming vacuous. 
The importance of decomposing the transmission processes 
involved must be emphasized. If not all messages reach each of 
the possible destinations, or if information circulates only within 
subgroups of individuals, a considerable simplification may be 
achieved. Similarly, when interactions are only two-way (as 
in an idealized telephone conversation) the system may be de-
composed into independent systems involving pairs. 
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By regarding communication processes as an open and dynamic 
system of messages, analysis of data can determine whether or 
the extent to which such processes exhibit "a life of their own" or 
possess "super-individual characteristics." This is often said to be 
a property of communication among men and a defining criterion 
for social organization but it has to my knowledge never been 
demonstrated. Inadequate data have so far prevented presenta-
tion of evidence to support such contentions. 
I have restricted my argument to the form of minimal communi-
cation data. While more sophisticated data need to be considered 
in order to provide interesting insights about communication proc-
esses, they cannot exclude the basic form I have discussed. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. This classification of three types of data js not exhaustive. 
Finer differentiations along more dimensions are necessary. How-
ever, in order to examine their methodological implications for 
communications research such a division is sufficient. 
2. Neither aggregational nor network data are powerful enough 
to provide explicit evidence about the existence and nature of 
communication processes. This does not mean that such data are 
totally useless. Their use in communication research may supple-
ment existing intuitions about communication and can provide 
evidence about certain marginal phenomena and correlates of 
the process. But the defining characteristics of communication 
can neither be detected in such data nor can the analysis of 
parameters of communication be based on them. 
3. This fundamental insufficiency of data in communication 
research accounts for several current conceptual problems associ-
ated with communication. On one hand, social problems that 
press toward solution seem to nourish questionable ontolOgical 
claims and dogmatic assertions. Questions regarding what is 
communication are often settled by philosophical arguments 
(e.g., a thing is what it is) or they are answered by reference to 
an authority in communication (he knows what communication is 
and what it is not). On the other hand, exclusive reliance on 
inadequate methods of investigation leads to the impoverish-
ment of the frnitful concept of "communication process" to the 
kind of concepts for which such methods can provide explicit 
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evidence. Thus, in the case of aggregational data, communication 
is often studied as a variable, 01' at best as statistical association 
between variables. In the case of network data, communication 
reduces to a static pattern of relationships or to a fixed symbolic 
structure. Consequently, the concept of communication is 
stripped of much of its potential explanatory power. 
4. One must realize that the major stumbling block in advanc-
ing knowledge about social communication is not the small 
quantity of research that is being done in the field. In fact, if data 
are not powerful enough to represent relevant parameters of the 
process, and/or analytical techniques are inadequate to the phe-
nomenon under observation, no increase in the number of studies 
can possibly be expected to produce a breakthrough. What is 
needed is an extensive development of computational techniques 
for processing communication data. Fostering such developments 
should be a prime target of the social communication sciences. 
5. The fact is pointed out that more and more data archives 
are emerging in the social sciences. The way· data are recorded 
and made available to future users significantly determines what 
will one day be studied and what may be discovered. Unless 
meaningful proposals for the storing and manipulation of com-
munication data are presented, communication research may 
severely constrain its potential contribution to knowledge. 
6. We have, I think, to admit the discomforting fact that our 
current knowledge of communication processes hardly stems from 
the explicit findings of research. It is our intuitive participation in 
human interpersonal communication that has provided the pri-
mary source of current insight. Intuitive knowledge of this kind 
tends to enter the semantic interpretation of research results sur-
reptitiously. We know very little about how to describe and 
reproduce communication processes symbolically or simulate them 
on a computer. Methods that would provide explicit evidence are 
scarce and techniques to control such processes in the real world 
are almost completely unreliable. 
It is hoped that this article was able at least to point to some 
formal obstacles to progress in communication research. It de-
pends on many creative minds to overcome them once they are 
identified as such. 
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